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Scholars have tended to ignore the phenomenon of immobility. I stumbled upon it 
myself only while researching its obverse, migration, and then only by accident. Some 
years ago, I came across a police report on a ‘fracas’ at a Muslim graveyard in 
Calcutta, where, soon after partition, Hindu refugees had seized the land and put a 
stop to burials.  Out of curiosity, I tried to find the graveyard, but this proved 
challenging. The people of the now-affluent Hindu neighbourhood that had sprung up 
in the area stared blankly at me when I asked them how to get there.  A few protested 
that no such burial ground had ever existed. Finally, I found an elderly Muslim 
rickshaw puller who knew where it was, and he offered to take me there. There was 
no pucca road leading to it, just a sodden dirt track, barely wide enough for two 
persons to pass. When we reached the cemetery, it was like a place time had passed 
by. Only a dozen or so people still remained in what had been, just a few decades 
before, a bustling Muslim locality.  They included the mutawwali, or custodian of the 
shrines, and a few members of his family, who lived in the most abject poverty I had 
ever seen. Their crumbling huts were dark and airless. They wore rags that barely hid 
their skeletal bodies.  The women gazed at me in silence, too listless even to brush the 
flies off the faces of children who neither laughed nor played.
2
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 My thoughts on migration (and immobility) have been influenced by David 
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2
 Also see, Joya Chatterji, 'Of Graveyards and Ghettos. Muslims in West Bengal, 
1947-67’, in Mushirul Hasan and Asim Roy (eds), Living Together Separately. 
Cultural India in History and Politics, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005. 
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At the time, I perceived only dimly a connection between this family’s 
immobility and their poverty; but it grew more evident in the decade that followed, as 
I worked on migrants in the Bengal delta. During this research project,
 3
 I kept 
encountering their counterparts – people whom I called ‘stayers-on’.  They were quiet 
people like the mutawwali, people who had gone nowhere, people whose stories 
haunted me.  These were not folk who had stayed on in peaceful places, in times of 
plenty. Rather, they had remained where they were despite violence, impoverishment 
and social boycott, which had left them culturally and politically marginalized.  They 
had stayed on while most others around them fled, in contexts of mass migration, 
when the ‘push factors’ could hardly have been more compelling. 
 
Immobility raises awkward questions for theorists of migration. Every 
dominant theory (whether of the neo-classical, new economic, world systems, 
institutions, network, or cumulative causation variety)
4
 seeks to account for why 
individuals (or households) develop migration strategies, how streams of migration 
arise, and how these are sustained over time.  From the standpoint of these theories, 
migration is unusual behaviour that requires explanation.
5
  Its obverse, staying in 
place, is seen as the norm, an ‘obvious’ state of affairs that calls for no accounting.   
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 This paper draws on research supported by the Arts and Humanities Research 
Council (UK), under the aegis of the ‘Bengal diaspora’ project, of which I was 
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specified, the interviews drawn upon here were conducted, translated, and transcribed 
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Ali Kouaouci, Adela Pellegrino and J. Edward Taylor  , ‘Theories of International 
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5
 Neo-classical theory does not suffer from this problem, of course (although it has 
been challenged on other grounds), since it postulates that the migration of workers 
overseas is caused by differences in wage rates between countries.  Migration, from 
this standpoint, between low-wage to high-wage-labour markets, is to be expected in 
all cases where the costs of such migration do not outweigh the anticipated benefits.  
But it does suffer from the problem of explaining why people do not migrate in larger 
numbers, in what Malmberg describes as the ‘immobility paradox’. Gunnar 
Malmberg, ‘Time and Space in International Migration’, in Tomas Hammar, Grete 
Brochmann, Kristof Tamas and Thomas Faist (eds), International Migration, 
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Yet, as historians are coming to recognize, assumptions about the ordinariness 
of immobility are insecure. For one thing, we know a great deal more about the 
mobile societies of early modern Asia.
6
 Between 1722 and 1776, over half of 
Sichuan’s ‘poylglot society’ were migrants, perhaps 3.4 million in number,7 while in 
South Asia, until 1800 perhaps half of the population was mobile for much of their 
adult lives
8
. For another, Asian mobility in the era of high imperialism is much better 
understood.
9
 Notwithstanding the argument by Washbrook and others that, by the 
mid-nineteenth century, the colonial state had destroyed the last vestiges of the mobile 
South Asia of earlier times, forcing its habitually peripatetic communities into a 
sedentary mode of life rooted in village communities,
10
 scholars of the late nineteenth 
century accept that its new economic conditions stimulated huge new migrations to 
cities, plantations, mines and factories, within India and beyond its shores. Amrith 
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suggests that between 1834 and 1940, over 28 million people left India’s shores.11 
From 1926 to 1930, when overseas emigration peaked, according to Kingsley Davis 
some 3.2 million Indians travelled abroad.
12
 Within India, in 1921 alone, the Indian 
census recorded more than 15 million internal migrants;
13
 a figure that underestimated 
the true extent of local and intra-regional movement.
14
 After 1921, spurred on by 
unprecedented growth in population, internal migration increased still faster; and from 
the 1970s, these rates of growth achieved dizzying heights. By 2013, perhaps one in 
five of India’s 1.2 billion people were internal migrants15. In China, between 1979 
and 2009, some 340 million people moved from villages to towns
16
. In Vietnam, 4.3 
million people migrated internally in the half-decade before 1999.
17
 In Bangladesh, 
after a war that created 10 million refugees, constant migration from the countryside 
to towns, at a rate of over 3% a year between 1975-2009, has led to one of the highest 
rates of urbanization in the world
18
. These are staggering figures.  But the broad brush 
of migration on the big canvas conceals higher rates still of local micro-mobility. 
Even in ‘sedentary’ agricultural societies, as geographers now concur, people do not 
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remain still: they are habitually engaged, to varying degrees, in various complex 
forms of spatial mobility
19
. 
 
Yet despite these cumulative gains in our understanding of the scale of 
mobility in early modern and modern Asia, and its dramatic acceleration in ‘the age of 
migration’,20 immobility continues to be seen as the ‘obvious’ state of affairs, and few 
have asked questions about its causes, conditions and histories.  
 
Where, unusually, such questions have been raised, the emphasis has been 
upon the barriers built by the states of the west against south-north migration.  Jorgen 
Carling, for instance, describes the daunting ‘immigration interface’ that migrants 
who go west have to negotiate. He suggests that this acts not so much a wall as a 
dense ‘jungle in which various paths are each associated with specific obstacles, costs 
and risks’. 21  As these costs and risks have escalated in recent times, he argues, 
‘involuntary immobility’ has grown.   
 
Yet Carling’s valuable study, as well as the handful of others that have looked 
at this phenomenon, look exclusively at migration from the developing world to 
western industrial societies.
22
  This focus is problematic, however.  Most of the 
world's migrants, and over 95% of its refugees since the Second World War, have not 
moved to the west.  They have remained within the global south, in, or close to, their 
regions of origin
23
. The south is not just a ‘source’ of migration, but its preeminent 
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destination.
24
 Once this overweening fact is recognized, the ‘immobility paradox’ 
takes on a quite different complexion.  In the global south, the capacity of states to 
seal their borders is notoriously weak.
25
 The costs of migration across these borders  - 
whether material or psychological – are much lower those of emigration to the west. 
The risks of travel are relatively low, linguistic and cultural skills easier to acquire, 
and networks enabling migration are often already in place. In post-colonial times, in 
the turbulent contexts of nation-building and minority-formation, the pressures to 
migrate have been intense, particularly upon those classed as ‘national minorities’. 
The mutawwali and his family, and others whose stories are discussed below, stayed 
on, but often were in fear of their very lives. They represent extreme cases, who, 
according to every existing theory of migration, should have left. And yet they 
remained.  
 
Why did they remain?  And why did this choice (if indeed it was a choice) 
drive them into poverty? This essay suggests some preliminary answers to these 
questions.  Its conclusions come out of a multi-disciplinary study of the greater 
Bengal
26
 region in the twentieth century, and the patterns of mobility and immobility 
that have arisen within it.  In that study, the methods deployed were those of an 
historian and an historical ethnographer: in addition to archival research, 160 
interviews were conducted amongst both Muslim migrants and stayers-on in the 
Bengal delta, on both sides of the border, in India and in Bangladesh. Access to 
interviewees was achieved by a combination of ‘snowballing’ through community 
‘gatekeepers’, personal networks, and serendipitous meetings. We interviewed 
stayers-on both in urban settings (Urdu-speakers in Town Hall Camp in Dhaka, in the 
former railway township of Syedpur, and well as in Kolkata’s Muslim 
neighbourhoods) and in rural areas (Bengali-speakers in villages in 24 Parganas South 
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in West Bengal). Our intention was to develop an historically sophisticated and 
ethnographically rich understanding of the processes and relationships
27
underpinning 
mobility in contexts of mass migration and violent nation creation. We did not go out 
looking for immobility, but we kept encountering it.  
 
This article seeks to account for that fact.  It begins by analyzing the impact of 
the intensifying links, in the late colonial era, between Bengal and the global 
economy. That impact varied widely on different groups of its people, in ways that 
had a profound bearing on their capacity to move.  The article develops the notion of 
‘deficits’  - at macro, micro and cumulative levels – each of which worked to inhibit 
the mobility of particular groups and individuals. Physical frailty and obligations of 
care, it shows, were crucial factors in shaping immobility.  Relations of gender and 
gender, and the inequalities embedded in these relations, produced ‘overabundances’ 
–of obligations to people and places – that tied certain people down.  Through a series 
of oral testimonies, the article seeks to bring to life these analytical categories and 
insights. Finally, it hints at the reasons why, and the ways in which, stayers-on have 
grown poorer.  
 
 
 
I 
 
Grids, bottlenecks and the development of ‘network poverty’ 
 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, eastern India was knitted 
into a new imperial system of trade and commerce, with Bengal at its centre. In the 
region, the interplay of private capital and the imperatives of empire – for profit, 
security, and cheap but safe governance – played out in specific ways. One crucial 
result was the creation of a particular transport grid, designed to serve a distinctive 
labour market; and, as this section will show, their particularities made the gulf 
between the mobile and the immobile ever greater. Features of the transport grid, the 
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 Lisa Malkki, Purity and Exile. Violence, Memory and National Cosmology among 
Hutu Refugees in Tanzania, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 
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labour market, and recruitment systems all combined to produce various (and often 
overlapping) forms of what might be called ‘network poverty’.  Even as the scale and 
pace of movement accelerated in the region, access to mobility among the people of 
the region became profoundly uneven. 
 
The discovery in the region of tea, jute, and coal  - three commodities that 
would become crucial for the imperial commerce of India – was a key factor in these 
processes. This, of course, is well known; but a brief recapitulation will set the 
context.  Native varieties of tea had been ‘discovered’ in Assam and Sylhet as early as 
1824, with commercial production beginning in earnest only in the 1850s. By 1859, 
the region already had fifty-nine ‘tea gardens’, chiefly state-run enterprises, soon 
transferred to private (mainly European) hands on liberal terms. By 1903, the tea 
plantations had engrossed 820 square miles of land, producing over 200 million 
pounds of tea each year,
28
 with Indian tea now ‘oust[ing] the produce of China’ from 
British markets.
29
 
 
Jute, a natural fibre long cultivated locally for its robustness, came into its own 
after the Crimean War interrupted the supply of hessian. Jute’s commercial 
manufacture as an ideal packaging material grew with the expansion of world trade, 
with British-owned mills around Calcutta exploiting the region’s competitive 
advantages. By 1903-1904, India’s annual jute export was valued at about twelve 
crore (a hundred million) rupees, and Bengal emerged not only as the world’s sole 
supplier of raw jute, but, along with Dundee, as one of two centres where it was 
processed. 
 
Neither jute nor tea would have flourished without coal. As steam replaced 
sail in the 1870s and 80s, ships also needed coal in huge quantities. As luck would 
have it, a long strip of ‘black country’ was discovered, initially in Raniganj, and 
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 The Imperial Gazetteer of India. The Indian Empire. Vol. III, Economic, Oxford: 
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southwest Bengal and eastern Bihar became India’s largest suppliers of coal. One of 
the first stretches of railway line in India was built to connect Calcutta to the 
coalfields of Raniganj. Soon afterwards, in 1894, mines in neighbouring Jharia began 
intensively to be opened up and were connected  ‘to a branch line of the East India 
Railway’, followed in quick succession by new fields at Giridih, and Bokaro, west of 
Raniganj. 
 
This concatenation of developments created a voracious appetite for labour, 
and eastern India’s transport systems were developed chiefly to carry labour, coal, 
other commodities swiftly and cheaply to the points where they were in demand. By 
the early 20
th
 century, rail, road, and steamer had linked eastern India together in a 
transport grid, where railways (albeit unevenly) connected the region to upper, 
central, and western India. Among the main railroads was the 1,468-mile long Bengal 
and North Western Railway that linked Bengal to the populous, labour-exporting 
districts of Oudh, Rohilkhand, Benaras, Jaunpur, and Shahbad, carrying thirteen 
million passengers a year by 1904.
30
 The Bengal-Nagpur Railway, which connected 
Calcutta in the east to Bombay in the west, transporting almost eight million 
passengers each year, was another key link in this chain, as was the East Indian 
Railway from Howrah to Kalka and Simla, the distant summer capital of India, on 
which more than twenty-five million passengers each year jostled for standing room 
only. The Assam-Bengal railway, 740 miles long, ran from Chittagong
31
 on the 
southeastern seaboard of Bengal, through the Surma river valley and Sylhet, and 
across Cachar into north Assam, and transported over two million passengers a year 
(as well as jute and tea) by the turn of the century,
32
 while numerous smaller gauge 
railways criss-crossed Bengal itself, carrying local traffic over shorter distances. 
 
By the 1910s, in addition to rail, a ‘very complete steamer system’ had begun 
to ply the region’s waterways. The heaviest investment in the steamer system was in 
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eastern Bengal and Assam, where topography rendered railways prohibitively 
expensive to build, and where connections by water were vital for the development of 
the (chiefly British-owned) jute and tea industries. By 1909, no less than thirteen 
stations in the eastern region each had at least thirty-four steamers services a month,
33
 
and rivers such as the mighty Brahmaputra, previously too treacherous to navigate 
during the monsoons, were now regularly served by ‘small feeder-steamers’ 
throughout the year.
34
 The road network, admittedly the Cinderella of Bengal’s 
transport system, and chronically starved of funds, was also improved, although 
‘trunk’ roads, which connected the centres of British power and trade had priority: by 
1930 over a thousand miles of trunk roads had been built (or repaired) in Bengal. 
Some ‘feeder roads’ were also constructed, usually as auxiliaries to the railways.  
 
Thus, by the early 20
th
 century, a vast swathe of territory, stretching beyond 
the Chota Nagpur plateau into parts of northern Madras, the Central Provinces, 
Orissa, eastern UP, and Bihar had come to be linked closely with central, eastern, and 
north Bengal, with Assam and Burma to the east, and Nepal to the north, by a 
transport network built to support the new industries. The whole region had become a 
vast, interconnected, zonal labour market serving these different, and often 
competing, sectors. By 1907, Assam contained ‘three-quarters of a million 
immigrants, or one eighth of its total population… The drain from Bengal to Assam 
[was] almost counterbalanced by an influx of nearly half a million natives of the 
United Provinces, who come to seek employment in the mills of Calcutta and Howrah 
and the coal mines of Burdwan, and as earth workers, palanquin-bearers, and field 
labourers all over Bengal proper’. By 1901, there were nearly half a million migrants 
in Burma.
35
 In addition, a quarter of a million people had migrated from Nepal into 
this region, more than half settling in contiguous British districts.
36
 Between 1911 and 
                                                        
33
 Sunil Kumar Munsi, Geography of Transportation in Eastern India under the 
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1931, the eastern zone consistently recorded the highest numbers of internal migrants  
(both immigrants and emigrants) in British India. By 1931, six million persons had 
moved within and from the greater Bengal region,
37
 a number already twice as large 
as the entire Indian diaspora worldwide in 1947,
38
 and almost twice the size of the 
Chinese diaspora in the USA in 2010. 
 
But, and this is a crucial point, access to mobility was profoundly unevenly 
distributed, within the region, with distinct (though sometimes intertwined) kinds of 
‘network poverty’ emerging in consequence.  The first arose from uneven access to 
the new modes of mass travel. One important factor was the conditions in the so-
called ‘coolie class’ of wagons. They were so dangerously overcrowded and 
unsanitary
39
 that only the strong and fit could face the grim prospect of travel in such 
conditions.  Railway staff all-too-frequently manhandled and abused the poor, 
‘especially ignorant villagers’,40 and treated them ‘worse than brute beasts’.41 Lower 
class carriages, into which passengers were stuffed like sardines into a tin, had no 
lighting or toilet facilities fifty years after rail travel began. Many carriages still had 
no seats.
42
 For the elderly, the frail and the disabled, travelling by train was not a real 
option.  Unaccompanied women and girls entrained at their peril. Even if the labour 
market had not increasingly denied access to women, (about which more below), 
conditions on the ‘transport grid’ made it a huge challenge for them even to reach it. 
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Another crucial axis of stratification was spatial. As Ravi Ahuja has noted, the 
new transport infrastructure of empire was built only in areas of commercial reward, 
political sensitivity and religious significance (major pilgrimage sites increasingly 
were given rail and road access).
 43
  By the 1920s, three exceptionally well-connected 
clusters of transport infrastructure had emerged in the greater Bengal region. One was 
southwestern Bengal ‘proper’, centred around Calcutta, the jute mills townships of 
Hooghly and Howrah, the coal mine districts of western Bengal and Bihar, and the 
railway hub at Asansol. The second was in eastern Bengal, with its hub at 
Narayanganj and Dacca, which had excellent steamer facilities. The third was the 
long ribbon of territory extending south to north from the port at Chittagong, through 
the Surma Valley in present-day Sylhet, into the tea garden districts of Assam, linked 
from end to end by the Assam-Bengal railway.
44
 (See Map 1.) 
 
However, these three ‘hotspots’ of transport infrastructure were not particularly 
well linked to each other. Beyond them, modern transport facilities penetrated 
unevenly, tentatively, or not at all. In theory, roads were intended to connect the 
‘interior’ to the ‘railheads’, but well into the 1930s, the little money that was spent on 
them mainly went to roads to towns that served as district or sub-divisional 
headquarters. In 1938, of a total of 91,936 miles of road, 86,541 (94%) were 
maintained by local authorities, about half of which were tracks and footpaths. 
45
 The 
King Report of that year concluded that ‘except from the system comprising the 
Grand Trunk Road… the province of Bengal has no “Road System” in the proper 
sense of the term’.46 Later, during World War II, government threw vast resources at 
new a airports and roads built to serve the war effort - Assam finally was connected to 
Bengal ‘proper’ and Burma by a great new arc of metalled road, thousands of miles 
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long.
47
 In the same period, labourers built ‘a fine network of … feeder roads’ to the 
region’s 145 new aerodromes, from which South East Asia Command took the fight 
to the Japanese.
48
 The scale of mobilization was such that the budget of the 
Engineering Department increased twenty-five-fold, from Rs 40 million in 1939-1940 
to Rs 1,000 million by 1944.
49
 Just as the logic of capital had driven the provision of 
infrastructure in times of peace, the geo- strategic imperatives of empire drove it 
forward in times of war.  
 
But places without claims to such ‘importance’ languished: providing cheap 
transport to every Indian was no part of the agenda of the Raj.  Comparing three 
districts before World War I – the first, 24 Parganas, central to the empire’s 
commercial and political purposes, the two others, Birbhum and Palamau, more 
marginal to them – reveals how stark these differences were. By 1914, 24 Parganas 
already had 324 miles of canals, 53 ferries, over 160 miles of railways, almost 600 
miles of metalled roads and over 1000 miles of village roads.
50
  Birbhum, by contrast, 
had no canals, no ferries, only 65 miles of ‘loop line’ narrow railway, 180-odd miles 
of metalled road and 300 miles of unmetalled roads.
51
   At the turn of the century, 
Palamau, probably Bengal’s most isolated district, was compared by one officer ‘to a 
ship at sea running short of provisions’.  Even after the railway reached Daltonganj 
(in the coal belt) in 1902, ‘the interior [had] not been opened fully’.  Roads in the 
district were so few and so bad that ‘only a small portion of the trade [was] carried by 
bullock carts, and in most parts pack bullocks form[ed] the only means of transport’.  
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Inaccessibility was ‘particularly marked in the south, a large roadless tract mostly 
covered by hill, rock and jungle’.52  
 
Between 1942 and 1971, this grid, such as it was, suffered a series of seismic 
shocks. In 1942, with the Japanese threatening India’s borders, the government 
slapped a  ‘Boat Denial’ policy onto a swathe of territory on Bengal’s southern 
seaboard, from Chandpur in the east to Kharagpur in the west. All boats capable of 
carrying more than ten people were either requisitioned for military use, sunk, 
destroyed, or taken to reception stations where they quickly fell into disrepair. As a 
result, by the end of the war, only 20,417 boats remained of an original total of 
66,563, and this in an area ‘in which communications [were] almost entirely by 
river’.53  
 
In 1947, the new boundary lines of partition wreaked yet more havoc. 
Radcliffe tried, as far he could, to preserve the integrity of major highways and 
railway lines while drawing the lines carving Bengal into two, but lesser roads and 
railway lines were torn apart. The most serious disruption for West Bengal was 
caused by North Bengal in effect being cut off from the rest of the state. To get from 
Malda (up north) due south to Calcutta where work was available, people now had to 
take a circuitous route via Rajmahal in Bihar, often involving numerous changes of 
trains and interminable waits.
54 The tea trade, with millions at stake, was hit hard, and 
only months after partition, the Indian Tea Planters’ Association put in a detailed plan 
that would connect Jalpaiguri, Darjeeling, Malda and West Dinajpur with Assam and 
with the rest of West Bengal.  The West Bengal government took note, and gave the 
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re-instatement of this link urgent priority. But the challenge of re-connecting smaller 
roads and lines markets was never addressed, producing new islands - large and small 
-  of isolation.
 55
  
As for East Bengal (East Pakistan), after partition it was left with only 300 
miles of paved roads in the entire province.
56
 In 1971, the Liberation War devastated 
an already woefully inadequate transport system: besides the destruction of railway 
workshops, signals and locomotives, ‘299 railway bridges (including the vital 
Hardinge and Meghna bridges) and 274 road bridges were either destroyed or 
damaged.  Seaports and several important inland channels were blocked by sunken 
vessels and war debris’.57 On the achievement of independence, ‘Bangladesh was left 
with no aircraft and no ocean-going vessels’.58  
Between 1942 and 1971, therefore, a transport grid that in the best of times 
had provided only the patchiest coverage, was partly destroyed or dis-integrated; so 
badly damaged that many new dark spots appeared off the grid, creating localities 
marooned and unconnected to vibrant centres of economic activity. New bottlenecks 
impeded, or severed, old connections.  
 
Colonial sources do not tell us what the ‘catchment area’ for a road or railway 
station was, or list the towns or villages around the facility which used it. How close 
was sufficiently close? How far was too far, putting the grid beyond people’s reach?  
 
However, two studies conducted in the 1970s give some hint of the answers. 
The first compared three villages in Bangladesh in the 1970s, soon after the 
Liberation War. The first village was on a metalled road. The second was 1.5 miles 
away from such a road, and the third was six miles away from an all-weather road. In 
the first village, half the respondents had seen a government official in the preceding 
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three months. In the third village only one in seven (or 14 per cent) had had that 
dubious privilege.
59
 If officers, with the resources of government at hand, still 
struggled to get to parts of their jurisdictions which were off the beaten track, the 
challenge to ordinary people in isolated villages to reach market towns or railheads, or 
to places even further away where labour was in demand  – can be easily imagined. 
 
The second study, conducted in India, draws on data gathered by the National 
Sample Survey in 1977-78. Its conclusions are even more startling. In the late 1970s, 
three of every four (72.3%) journeys of over one kilometer in rural India were made 
on foot. (This compared with only 34.8% of such journeys in urban areas, where, of 
course, there was much more public transport). 
60
 Village dwellers used bicycles for 
only one in ten of their journeys, and railways even more rarely. For most of rural 
India, motorized travel by road was either not available or not affordable.  So most 
people had to walk, most of the time, because they had no other option.  
As a consequence, they could not travel far. Inevitably, the shortest distances 
travelled overall (in the whole of India) were by those who lived in ‘backward’ areas 
(from the perspective of infrastructure provision) such as Arunachal, Tripura and 
Manipur
61
. In Assam and Bihar on average, ‘it took [on average] three households, 
each with more than five persons, to find one person who took a trip of more than one 
kilometer in the reference week’.62  
Compare these findings with the millions of travellers who, for the past 
century, had journeyed to work, sometimes going many hundreds of miles because 
the grid linked their homes by rail to distant work-places, and the stunning differences 
between living ‘on the grid’ and living off it begin to be clear. People who lived ‘off 
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the grid’ had little or no experience of the dramatic effects of ‘space-time 
compression’ of modern modes of travel. As Ahuja has argued, late-colonial 
‘development’ opened up new lines of inequality within regions, 63  and, as these 
studies suggest, post-colonial states have done relatively little to redress them. The 
inequities, unevennesses (and eccentricities) of the grid have not merely compounded 
and reshaped older differences of wealth and status, they have created an altogether 
new type of inequality – measured by access (or lack of access) to mobility.  
 
 
 
 
These problems of asymmetrical access to mobility were compounded by the 
idiosyncrasies of the labour market, which, for all its size, evolved in ways that 
allowed only certain kinds of people entry. For one, opportunities for work 
increasingly came to be restricted by region of origin, with a marked tendency 
towards an ethnicisation of the labour force. This pattern emerged organically as 
employers (in every sector) concluded that migrant ‘pardesis’ (foreigners) were more 
‘reliable’ and ‘amenable to discipline’.  As Kerr has noted, long-distance migrants 
who had travelled too far from their villages and fields to be drawn back into the 
annual cycle of sowing and harvesting, or were not trapped by forms of servitude to 
local agrarian elites, soon emerged as the ‘modern’ employee of choice.64  
 
In time, however, recruiting practices that had evolved in response to irregular 
labour supply hardened  - in tune with the mood music of the times - into racial 
stereotypes. Local people everywhere, or so it seems, were deemed to be ‘lazy’, 
whereas certain immigrant ‘races’ and ‘peoples’ were considered good workers by 
contrast. The tea gardens in Darjeeling thus recruited ‘Gurkha’ workers from the hill 
populations of Nepal, and also relied on Santal labour from Champaran to the west. 
The Assam tea gardens soon became notorious for their unscrupulous recruiting of 
workers from Chotanagpur, Bihar and the United Provinces, who were then forced to 
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stay on, despite the brutal conditions of work and life in the plantations.
65
 Most mill 
hands in the jute industry were also migrants from upper India, particularly from 
Bihar and the United Provinces, and also from famine-prone parts of northern Orissa 
and the Madras Presidency.
66
  
 
As decades passed, these stereotypes became more elaborate, so that particular 
forms of labour within each industry came to be deemed appropriate only for people 
from a particular place, and supposedly of a specific ‘type’. Santals were favoured by 
tea planters for their ‘hardiness’ in withstanding the humid climate and harsh 
conditions of the Assam gardens; allegedly they were immune to malaria, willing to 
work long hours, and above all, docile. Santal women and children were deemed to 
have the build best suited to the plucking of tea. Assamese workers, by contrast, were 
irredeemably lazy in the planters’ eyes, and as a result, by 1884, in consequence, only 
five percent of all workers in Assam’s plantations were local people.67 ‘Poorbeas’ 
(men from eastern UP and Bihar) were preferred in the jute mills. In the coal fields, 
the ‘bulk of the colliers belong[ed] to the Kamia class of landless labourer’, although 
some were ‘agriculturists holding land at a distance from the coalfields’. 68  (Both 
groups, for reasons that of course had nothing to do with ‘race’, were unlikely to 
‘abscond’ back to the fields in the harvesting season.) Poorbeas soon came to 
dominate the regular staff on the railways, and as Parth Shil’s work shows, Bengal’s 
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constabulary as well.
69
 Men from Noakhali and Sandwip in East Bengal were 
ubiquitous on Calcutta’s docks. Sylhetis soon came to monopolize the boiler rooms of 
steamships. And so on. 
 
This process of ethnicisation was also consolidated by systems of labour 
recruitment, which (as is well known) relied heavily on sirdars or jobbers of various 
kinds. Sirdars enlisted men from their own caste, community, kinship group, and 
village, and this hardened the links between particular areas of recruitment and 
specific sectors of the economy. Even within these recruitment ‘hotspots’, 
opportunities for movement came to be restricted to particular networks, access to 
which sardars sought tightly to control. In time, therefore, the ‘segmentary’70 labour 
market in these ‘modern’ sectors of the economy became less open to the population 
at large, even when recruitment swelled to record levels.  
 
As Chandavarkar has shown for Bombay, the power of jobbers waned in the 
latter half of the twentieth century.
71
 But access to jobs is still, in the 21
st
 century, 
dominated by networks. Those historically excluded from such networks continue to 
find it hard to break into these employments. Anirudh Krishna’s study of poverty in 
35 villages in north India, conducted in 2002, bears this out.  In 309 cases where 
young men had successfully diversified household income by migrating to the city, he 
discovered, 198 had relied upon a contact, ‘a friend, or more often a relative, already 
established in the city’.72 But others, ‘equally well qualified in most other respects 
have not been equally able to take advantage of these opportunities’. Krishna cites 
one respondent, Pratap Singh: 
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I am educated [to high school level] and eager to get a job in the city, but I 
have no way of knowing what jobs exist.  I have no one in the city who 
can find out and tell me. It is very expensive for me to live there waiting 
for a job, and my family cannot afford these expenses.  Some day, I hope, I 
will get a job and help my family.  I wish I had an uncle or cousin in…[the 
nearest city] who could help me, just as Gopi Singh’s brother-in-law 
helped him to find a job.  
 
Note: everyone in this vignette is male.  Pratap Singh is a man, as is Gopi Singh 
and his helpful brother-in-law.  Pratap Singh bemoans his lack of uncles and (male) 
cousins who might have been able to help him. Women do not enter his narrative of 
work and the routes to mobility at all.   
 
This is because gender was, and remains, another crucially important axis of 
differentiation, which cuts across regions and even networks, in ways that the next 
section will discuss more fully. But here the historical backcloth is relevant. In every 
industry, as historians have shown single, able-bodied men dominated the migrant 
working population from the start, and that dominance grew with every passing 
decade. Even if women had been able easily, say, to hop onto a train, which they 
could not, employers grew ever more reluctant to hire them as the perceived costs of 
doing so rose with increasing regulation, as Samita Sen has shown for the jute 
industry.
 73
 The coal industry hired some women and children well into the twentieth 
century, but paid them lower wages for carrying coal to the tubs and the mineshafts.  
The industry became increasingly reluctant to hire them from the 1930s, when the 
prohibition on employing women for underground work came into force, leaving 60 
percent of women in mining centres unemployed.
74
 Tea plantations were an exception 
-- women and children continued to be employed – but this was chiefly in plucking 
and hand-weeding, tasks that were deemed ‘unskilled’ and were poorly paid. Colonial 
legal regimes made matters worse.  In 1901, the Assam Labour Emigration Act 
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denied married women the legal capacity to enter into labour contracts without their 
husbands’ consent.75 Of course, historians of labour know all of this. But the point 
here is that women’s ability to move to seek work was curtailed in numerous, 
intertwined ways. ‘Network poverty’ had profoundly gendered characteristics.  
 
Admittedly, labour conditions in these sectors of the economy were exploitative 
in the extreme. Employers paid as little as they could and workers endured appalling 
hardship. Yet scholars of migration cannot ignore the fact that the mobility afforded 
by these new industries – mobility that in times of famine, epidemic or riot, made the 
difference between life and death – was tilted heavily in favour of men and was 
asymmetrically distributed. 
 
With the end of empire and partition, the implications of being stuck, always 
grave, became even more profound.  As I have shown elsewhere, the mass migrations 
after partition followed in grooves of mobility carved out in colonial times.
76
  People 
who had access to mobility used prefigures routes and connections to get out when 
times were hard or indeed, impossible. In these ways the ‘economic migrants’ in the 
labour markets of empire became the refugees of post-independence South Asia. This 
is the context in which the predicament of the immobile presents itself in stark relief.  
 
 
 
 
 
‘Deficits’ and ‘over-abundances’ 
 
In an important study, three economists recently tried to get to the heart of 
why people in Rongpur district in Bangladesh, notoriously prone to annual famines 
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called monga, did not migrate during these famines despite knowing the potential 
benefits of getting away and the dire consequences of staying in place.  Fears of failed 
migration, insufficient savings, and poor information about the opportunities on offer, 
so they discovered, did not adequately explain this reluctance to migrate. The authors 
described the behavior of respondents as ‘something of a puzzle’, admitting that 
‘there is some element [here] that we do not understand’.77  
 
This section suggests some answers to this conundrum, using oral history 
interviews with ‘stayers on’.  The interviews took place in three locations where 
‘stayers on’ had clustered. Two of the sites were in urban Bangladesh, in Dhaka and 
Syedpur respectively, where our interviewees were Urdu- or Bhojpuri- speakers of the 
so-called ‘Bihari’ community who stayed on in Bangladesh after 1971, despite the 
virulent climate there of hostility and violence against them.
78
  The third location was 
a rural settlement in the south-west corner of West Bengal, close to the Bangladesh 
border to the east, and the Bay of Bengal to the south. Here we interviewed Bengali-
speaking rural Muslim families who had stayed on in West Bengal in India despite 
intense pressures on them to leave after partition.  
 
These interviews suggest some conclusions about patterns of staying on that 
are best expressed in terms of ‘overabundances’ and ‘deficits’ of certain attributes, 
albeit in different combinations.  Strikingly, the main ‘deficit’ proved not to be a lack 
of education, cash, or even access to networks, (although these were significant) but 
physical frailty. The ‘over-abundances’ – ‘sticky’ qualities that lead to inertia -  are 
perhaps less surprising, but nonetheless profoundly revealing: they have to do with 
deeply internalized, albeit socially constituted, obligations of care.  
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Salima (Image 1 ), is a widow, now in her fifties, who  has lived in one tiny 
room in Town Hall camp in Dhaka for over thirty years.  A small, thin, bespectacled 
woman, she shares the room with her adult son and his wife, her daughter and 
grandchildren -  of whom one, Taukir, about fourteen years of age, is disabled. 
Salima’s husband used to work in the railways, but during the troubles of 1971, he 
was tortured, and eventually died from his injuries.   For several months, Salima 
nursed him and tended their children. After he died, she went to Dhaka, as she had 
relatives in the city. She became a squatter in what would eventually become the 
Camp: 
 
‘This was then a market place. It was empty. We put jute curtains up and 
started to live here.  Things were very difficult. There were no fans – 
only lights bulbs tied to bamboo poles, one providing light to a few 
families together.’ 
 
This room is now one of hundred similar rooms in Town Hall Camp, itself one of 
several ‘Bihari’ camps in Dhaka. Salima’s room is completely without ventilation – 
when we interviewed her, the stale air smelled strongly of kerosene.  None of her 
children have had any education.  She works as a cleaner for a local NGO, and 
supplements her meager income doing piece-work for garment manufacturers. 
 
One by one, most of Salima’s male relatives, including her father and brother, 
left for Pakistan, where the family had kin and connections.  Interestingly, Salima is 
still in contact with her father. But he was unable (or unwilling) to take his widowed 
daughter and grandchildren over to Pakistan to live with him, and she seems equally 
unable to consider moving.  
 
Why did Salima stay on? In the first instance, to care for her fatally wounded 
husband. After his death soon after the war ended, as a single woman with very small 
children, one of whom was disabled, she calculated that she (and her vulnerable 
dependents) would be better able to survive in Dhaka where she had some networks 
of (mainly female) familial support. (Indeed, even as the interview was being 
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conducted, one of Salima’s female relatives, who lived close by, dropped in to help 
Salima – whose eyesight is beginning to fail - complete her quota of piecework on 
time.)  As a squatter in Town Hall Camp, with 36 square feet which she occupies but 
does not own, she is tied to place.  She is also pinned down by her responsibilities for 
her daughter (who was abandoned by her own husband), and for her disabled 
grandson Taukir.  With all others who might have shared these responsibilities with 
her having emigrated long ago, they weigh heavily on her shoulders. 
 
Also in Town Hall Camp lives Sairun, a 45-year-old widow.  She occupies a 
small room with her nephew, his wife and their two-year-old child.  (Image 2) She 
was born in Old Dhaka, and, as with Salima, her family had links with the railways.  
But in March, 1971, her husband died.  
 
‘What happened to him?’ we asked.  
 
‘He left for his business as usual one morning and never returned.  He must 
have been killed.’  
 
During or after the 1971 War, every single one of Sairun’s male relatives – her 
son, her brother (and his wife and children)  - left for Pakistan, where they now live in 
Orangi township in Karachi.  But Sairun stayed on in Dhaka.  This was because one 
of her sisters fell sick and eventually died, leaving behind two small children. Sairun, 
who had nursed her bedridden sister, brought these two orphans up along with her 
own two children.  She never travels anywhere, so she tells us. Even though she is in 
touch with her Pakistani family, she has not seen her son, now an adult, since 1971.  
None of her children is educated, even though Sairun herself can read and write – she 
occasionally supplements her insubstantial income as a maid by giving tuitions in 
Arabic. 
 
Or take the story of Mehrunissa Khatun, a ‘stayer-on’ who lives in Chamra 
Godown Camp in Syedpur, where we interviewed her. Syedpur was once the site of 
the largest railway workshop of the Assam-Bengal railway, which previously 
employed thousands of ‘Urdu-speaking’ up-country migrants, who were so numerous 
that they once made up three out of four of the town’s population. But both Sydepur, 
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as well as neighbouring Parbartipur and Santahar, came under vicious attack during 
and after the Liberation War, and thousands fled for their lives. Mehrunissa’s family 
was one of hundreds which, during the trouble (‘gondogol’ is the Bengali word our 
informants use to describe these events), fled from Parbatipur – a smaller railway 
colony – to the larger town of Syedpur, seeking safety in numbers.  
 
Just as  Salima and Sairun, Mehrunissa had two very young children - two 
daughters (aged three years and five months respectively). She says: 
 
‘Here I had three more children.  One baby died at the age of ten 
months. Then I had another daughter and she is now in Pakistan. …My 
eldest daughter is called Shah Jahan and is married to a man who works in 
the trucks as a coolie…. He is parentless so he lives here with us in 
Syedpur.  They [her daughter and son-in-law] have five children.’  
 
In 1978, Mehrunissa’s own husband, who was ‘bed-ridden’ for years – ‘he 
used to cough up blood’  - died. Mehrunissa continued to care for all her surviving 
children, and, when her oldest daughter married, her son-in-law as well, and her many 
grandchildren.  Times were so hard that they often had nothing to eat. But somehow 
they struggled on.  In 1985, one of Mehrunissa’s sisters was able to migrate with her 
own husband and children to Pakistan.  She took Mehrunissa’s younger daughter, 
Sabra, with her to Pakistan, marrying her off to her own son, to relieve her sister of 
the burden of one more mouth to feed.   
 
Since then, Mehrunissa managed to support her family by working as a maid 
in the house of a Canadian aid-worker. Like Salima, Mehrunissa had kinsfolk in 
Pakistan (her sister and daughter).  She longs to see Sabra, but she will not herself 
migrate, because she has responsibilities to her other children and grandchildren. She 
still lives in the same place in Chamra Godown Camp, in extremely reduced 
circumstances.  
 
Maryam also lives in in Syedpur. (Image 3) She is perhaps sixty years old, 
and the head of a household of nine people, whom she supports also by working as a 
maid, and occasionally sewing garments.   She has lived here since the 1971 war 
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began, when she moved with her husband from the neighbouring railway colony at 
Parbatipur.  Her husband, a mechanic in the railways, was ailing ‘with some stomach-
related illness’, and she looked after him (as well as her children) until his death in 
1975. 
 
The details of Hanifa’s story are distressing, but not unusual in this milieu.  
She lived in the railway township of Santahar in Bogra before the war, where ‘Urdu-
speakers’ experienced some of the worst violence. ‘When the war started’, she said,  
 
‘I was picked up and beaten up. I had two ribs and my skull 
broken. My husband, two sons, three daughters and grandchild were killed 
that night. …Then, taking us all for dead, they left… When I regained 
consciousness I realized that my young son Habib was still alive, and that 
my baby Zafar, despite the deep gash he had on his stomach, was alive.  
So I rushed them both to the doctor…A kindly [person] treated the 
children and saved them. After that we survived by eating frogs and grass 
and mud and wearing coarse cloth made of jute.’ 
 
 
 
These stories all have a common narrative thread. The ‘stayers-on’ who hung 
on despite threats to life and limb did not always, in the first instance, lack access to 
networks that might have helped them migrate. On the contrary, everyone we 
interviewed in this context belonged to the Bhojpuri-speaking labour diaspora 
connected with the railways, and they all had rich and far-flung networks across India, 
Pakistan and Bangladesh, and indeed, further afield.
79
 Nor did they lack skills – many 
were literate, and some were moderately well off before 1971. But they lacked other 
elements of what I have elsewhere defined as ‘mobility capital’, the bundle of assets 
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and competences that makes moving possible.
80
  Above all, they lacked health. Or if 
they were able-bodied themselves, they had powerful countervailing obligations to 
care for the vulnerable and infirm, whether infants, the ill, the aged or the disabled, 
for whom they felt responsible. Most in this category were women.  
 
This suggests – somewhat counter-intuitively – that while networks, cash, 
‘know-how’, and skills are important elements of mobility, good health is vital. So 
also is the ‘freedom’ to leave others behind, to abandon (socially constructed) duties 
of care. The women we interviewed seemed to practise what Sara Ruddick describes 
as ‘maternal thinking’, responding to the ‘prolonged physical fragility and therefore 
prolonged dependence’, not only of children, 81  but of fragile others, by taking 
responsibility for their care. Even at times of grave danger to themselves (graphically 
demonstrated by Hanifa’s story), many women chose not to flee, but to stay where 
they were to try to ensure that their children survived. Those who were already carers 
of children took on the responsibility first to care for sick and disabled relatives, and 
then (as with Sairun and her sister) to look after those orphaned by the death of these 
relatives. They tended the fragile, the sick and the vulnerable among their kin, even if 
this put them in danger. If this held them back, and meant they had to pass over 
opportunities to migrate in the bargain, they did this with a sense of resignation.  
None, other than Hanifa, expressed bitterness or regret.  Indeed, few described it as a 
decision at all.   
 
Sickness and frailty stalk these narratives.  Husbands, children, sisters, and 
sons-in-law fell ill and died of diseases our informants could not name. They merely 
described their most graphic symptoms –‘he used to cough up blood’ or ‘he had some 
stomach ailment’, or ‘she was bedridden’, or ‘his mind went wrong’.  
 
These life stories, and others of their ilk, suggest that sickness, disease and 
disability are surely part of the answer to the ‘puzzle’ of the ‘immobility paradox’. 
Further, given the strong co-relation between poverty and illness, and the dynamic 
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relationship between illness, dependency and care  -  they point to a vicious circle that 
traps the ill, the dependent and their carers in lives of  immobility and poverty. 
 
 
 
 
However, while most examples of staying on can be explained by this cycle of 
dependency, not all can.  There are those who had over-abundant obligations 
produced by deeply-held religious beliefs, responsibilities to graves and to ancestors.  
They were usually eldest sons.  My final story throws light on the description of the 
graveyard with which I began.  
 
 
Shahid and Jalal Gazi are brothers, originally from the village of Kalitola in the 
southeast corner of present-day West Bengal. The village was ‘off the grid’  – it was 
served neither by rail nor steamer. But it happened to be just a few miles away from 
the Radcliffe line that now divided West Bengal in India from eastern Pakistan.  
After partition, faced with violence and intimidation, Shahid, the younger brother, 
together with many other members of the family, migrated just across the border.  
Carrying small bundles of possessions over their shoulders, they trekked by foot on 
land and by small boat over water, to Khupdipur in East Pakistan. But his brother 
Jalal did not leave. Today Jalal (aged about 95) is too ill and confused to be able to 
say much. His son, Fakhruddin, fills in the gaps in his story: 
 
We are originally from Kalitola. The Hindus kicked us away from there so 
we came here [Dokkhin Parghumte] where we had family. Our whole 
place in Kalitola used to be Muslim. Then one day [around 1950] some 
refugees who had come from the other side announced that Muslims 
wouldn’t be allowed to live there, that they would have to leave … They 
went from house to house, sometimes, raped and looted, at other times 
burned down our homes and our granaries … My elder brother ... felt he 
wouldn’t be able to keep his honour and left for Khupdipur [across the 
border]… At that time all the Muslims of Jogeshganj, Parghumte, 
Kalitola, Samshernagar, Gobindokati left this place ... Our family’s land 
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used to stretch all the way to the river, now it ends with the field which 
surrounds our homestead … One by one all of my uncles left. But my 
father Jalal Gazi, being the eldest, stayed back to look after the mosque 
and the graves of our ancestors. 
 
 
Today their community of Muslims is reduced to about fifty people, cramped 
into only four homesteads. The Gazi family had clearly once been modestly 
prosperous. After riots broke out in 1950, many members of the clan went to Pakistan. 
Those who were left behind did not lack contacts in Pakistan – indeed, they had many 
close relatives and contacts who had made good on ‘the other side’. But they stayed 
on in India because they were bound to ‘home’, either, as in the case of Jalal, the 
eldest son, by responsibilities to the graves of his ancestors, or by infirmity, or by the 
need to care for the elderly and infirm. Fakhruddin and Hamidullah Gazi, respectively 
the son and nephew of Jalal Gazi, have stayed even though there are very few 
opportunities for them in the locality, and despite the fact that the former was ‘kicked 
out’ of his job at the local school, after being passed over for promotion by a less 
qualified Hindu. They felt obliged to look after the old man, who is sick, disorientated 
and frail.  
 
‘Previously,’ Fakhruddin continued, ‘we all wanted to leave as our leaders all 
left, but it is not so now. We can’t go and neither do we want to go.’  
 
Their decision to stay has resulted in a catastrophic downward spiral in wealth 
and status. The landholdings of this clan have shrunk to one small field. The younger 
men in the family are either unemployed or inappropriately employed, and they are 
deeply pessimistic about their prospects. Interestingly, they have lost contact with 
their kin across the border. National borders – even ones as relatively porous as those 
between India and Bangladesh – and attempts to control movement across them have 
undoubtedly played a part in this. Since the Enemy Property Act came on the statute 
book in 1967, maintaining contact with ‘enemy’ aliens across the border has been 
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fraught with danger,
82
 and this may explain why two brothers, separated by partition, 
had neither seen nor heard from each other for several decades. It was only when we 
took news and photographs of Jalal over to Shahid in Bangladesh that contact 
between them was re-established.   
 
[Image 4 here]  
 
Their story reveals a critically important point overlooked by much of the 
literature on networks: namely, that networks atrophy and rupture in adverse 
circumstances. After the blood brothers lost touch with each other at a time of 
upheaval and chaos, the ties between them withered. For the family members who had 
stayed behind, this meant a cumulative decline in their capacity to move, with assets 
stripped and familial networks that might once have facilitated their movement 
gradually disintegrating: ‘We can’t go and neither do we want to go.’ Among the less 
mobile, then, it seems that an initial reluctance to move could foreclose their options 
for migration at a later date, keeping people like Fakhruddin and Hamidullah Gazi 
stuck in their unenviable situations.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In his study of north Indian villages, Anirudh Krishna concludes that most of 
those who escaped poverty had done so by ‘building a bridge to the city’. Very few of 
those who remained where they were in rural areas were able to break free of the 
destitution in which they lived.
83
 Similarly, the study of villages in famine-prone 
Rongpur shows that those who migrated (to areas where wages were higher) 
significantly improved the lives of their families back in the village (as measured by 
consumption of calories and expenditure on children’s education).84 Migration, the 
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authors show, is a ‘profitable technology’. 85  It is also, as we know, a ‘technology’ 
that, in times of upheaval, provides a means of ‘escape from violence’.86   
 
This paper has drawn attention to the phenomenon of immobility, insisting that 
it demands greater attention in an age of ever-increasing migration.  It suggests that 
for many people this immobility has arisen historically, as a result of being ‘left out’, 
or left off, the grid, rendering them unable (for reasons of age, health or gender) to use 
it safely.  Spatial differences were very significant – for many people who lived off 
the grid, the costs and risks of movement were simply too great, with these inhibiting 
factors having remained essentially unchanged since early-modern times. Even within 
regions that were connected to the grid, access to mobility tended to be restricted to 
healthy male members of the ‘right’ ethnic group, caste or kinship network. Deficits 
of these enabling qualities led to different forms of ‘network poverty’, which, for 
some unfortunate people, overlapped, with one factor reinforcing others to leave them 
stuck in their localities.  
 
And even among members of the ‘right’ ethnic group, caste or kinship network, 
some individuals were far more ‘stuck’ than others. As the second part of the paper 
shows, the most inert are sometimes people who, at least on the face of it, are not 
‘network deprived’ in these ways.  Among them, however, were the most vulnerable 
– the sick and the disabled, the very old and very young – and those who looked after 
them. The women whose stories we heard were all from richly networked railway 
families – but they were held back by the fragility of those for whom they felt 
responsible. As Livingston has observed in her study of disability in Botswana, 
‘debility…troubles, mobilizes and intensifies social relations’, and indeed, ‘the moral 
imagination’. 87  Sickness and dependency generated ‘over-abundant’ obligations, 
responsibilities from which some people – mainly women - could not, and would not, 
walk away.  
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Furthermore, having made the initial choice to stay, many of these people found 
their capacity to move eroded as the years passed by.  Address books got lost (many 
women wept as they told us this), the emigrants among their kin got on with their new 
lives, and the ties that once bound those who left to those who stayed behind 
weakened as time went by. Thus networks that might have enabled migrations at a 
later date withered and died, and any notion of moving grew more and more 
unrealistic. So stayers-on remained where they were, while the world around them 
moved on, moved more, and moved more rapidly. 
 
This choice (as well as the conditions that led to it in the first place) appearw to 
have combined to propel these households into a downward spiral into poverty.   
While the interviews cited here are mainly with ‘Biharis’ in Bangladesh, whose 
political status is in many respects extremely precarious, Muslim ‘stayers-on’ in rural 
West Bengal appear to have fared little better. Decades of communist government 
notwithstanding, they are among the most impoverished communities in the region. 
Statistics show them to be disproportionately likely – compared to the rest of the 
population – to be uneducated, unemployed or under-employed. Despite constituting 
about 28 per cent of West Bengal’s total population, Muslims hold less than 2 per 
cent of government jobs, and less than 1 per cent of all ‘service-level’ jobs in the 
private sector.
88
 They tend to live in desperately overcrowded spaces, with little or no 
institutional support. Their children are more likely than those of other communities 
to remain illiterate and have shorter lives. Their daughters are more likely to marry 
young and to die in childbirth. Their sons, in disproportionately large numbers, fall 
foul of the law and spend years in prison.
89
 A recent study of Muslims ‘stayers-on’ in 
contemporary Calcutta showed that four out of every five now live in overcrowded 
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slums, where entire households (an average size of 6.65 persons)
90
 sleep, eat, and 
work in tiny one-room shacks, the average size of which is less than 120 square feet.
91
 
Their literacy is exceptionally low. More than nine out of ten have no ‘chance of 
getting admitted to any kind of educational institution [whether] recognized or 
unrecognized, or unaffiliated or public’. Drop-out rates among the few lucky children 
who are admitted to schools are estimated to be as high as 80 per cent. These urban 
communities survive mainly by self-employment in family-run sweatshops where 
they work for pitifully low returns embroidering gold thread onto cloth, making paper 
goods like kites, binding books, and making cheap leather goods.
92
  
 
The history of immobility in South Asia, and its intricate relationship with 
poverty – is complex, and as yet little understood. Much remains to be done. These 
stories, it is hoped, will help stimulate more research, while giving us some insight 
into why, and in what ways, mobility has become ‘a scarce and unequally distributed 
commodity’, and one of the ‘main stratifying factors of our late modern or post 
modern times’. 93  
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